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NOTES
DOES THE DISSOLUTION OF COVENANT MARRIAGES
MIRROR COMMON LAW ENGLAND'S
SUBORDINATION OF WOMEN?
INTRODUCTION
On July 15, 1997, the Louisiana Legislature passed a covenant
marriage law,' designed to strengthen the family and decrease
divorce rates. This law limits the means of ending undesirable
unions by curtailing the causes for divorce. The limitations placed
on parties who wish to dissolve a covenant marriage are reminis-
cent of the restricted means of ending English common law
marriages during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Both
laws provide a narrowly defined method to dissolve marriages,
while also placing women in subordinate positions in the commu-
nity after divorce. Both the covenant marriage law in Louisiana
and the English common law reflect societal attempts to preserve
the marital unit, resulting in a weakened social status for women
financially, psychologically, and socially once a divorce is finally
obtained. One could question whether society has come full circle,
in that women are returning to subordinate positions in society
under the covenant marriage law, positions similar to those they
held 300 years ago during the Tudor and Stuart reigns.
An examination of common law England's matrimonial and
divorce laws is necessary to this investigation of covenant mar-
riages because English common law is a basis for twentieth century
American divorce law.2 Modern fault divorces originated from the
common law concept that marriage was a sacrament and should not
be ended, except in extreme situations.3 American no-fault divorce
laws provide for divorce upon a party's showing of irreconcilable
differences which create an irreparable breakdown of the
marriage 4 -a theory similar to the Puritan and Protestant beliefs
1. See infra Part V (discussing covenant marriage). A covenant marriage is an
alternative to the no-fault divorce. The entrance into and the exit from a covenant marriage
are made more difficult than with a traditional marriage. Parties agree that their marriage
is a covenant which may not be broken, despite difficulties they may encounter. Only a
complete breach of the marital covenant may permit a dissolution of the marriage. See id.
2. See LENORE J. WEITMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 6 (1985).
3. See id.
4. See id. at 15.
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that incompatibility should be grounds for divorce. Louisiana
legislators integrated both fault and no-fault ideals into the new
law, intensifying the parallels between the English common law
and the covenant marriage law.
Despite similarities between the two laws, substantial differ-
ences exist. Women in the twentieth century, even within a cove-
nant marriage, have more equality, freedom, and protection than
their predecessors had during the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. The covenant marriage law in Louisiana, like proposed
legislation in other states, simply limits the ease with which
divorces may be obtained and contains provisions which adversely
affect women. As such, the covenant marriage is not a full return
to the completely subordinate position that women endured during
the Tudor and Stuart periods.
I. INTRODUCTION TO TUDOR AND STUART SOCIETY
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the belief in
the permanence of marital unions strongly influenced marriage and
the composition of the family.' Societal values placed an emphasis
upon religion, whereby marriage was a sacrament that could not be
broken.6 Church officials wanted to keep marriages together
because they believed that separations did not adhere to church
law.7 "A consummated marriage had the immutable character of
divine law and was held, by God's own ordinance, absolutely
indissoluble."8
Before the Reformation in England,9 Roman Catholicism was
the official religion of England. Under its precepts, followers could
not dissolve a marriage if it had been consummated.1 ° A few
exceptions existed, including a flaw in the marriage ceremony,
consanguinity, or the existence of a prior valid union." After
England's break with Catholicism, following the Reformation,
practitioners of the newly founded Church of England also inter-
preted the Gospel as stating that marriage was an indissoluble
5. See LAWRENCE STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE: ENGLAND 1530-1987, at 2 (1990) [herein-
after ROAD TO DIVORCE].
6. See MARTIN INGRAM, CHURCH COURTS, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND, 1570-1640,
at 145 (1987).
7. See id. at 4.
8. O.R. MCGREGOR, DIVORCE IN ENGLAND: A CENTENARY STUDY 2 (1957).
9. The English Reformation progressed throughout the years of 1534 to 1597. See ROAD
To DIVORCE, supra note 5, at 301.
10. See COLIN S. GIBSON, DISSOLVING WEDLOCK 10 (1994).
11. See id. The exceptions mentioned are not an exhaustive list.
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union.' 2 In situations when divorce was necessary, the ecclesiasti-
cal, or church courts, granted either a permanent separation with
no remarriage or an annulment.
13
External pressures also influenced the belief in long-standing
marriages without divorce. Families often arranged marriages for
alliances, with no concern for the parties involved in the marriage. 4
The family members' interference kept spouses together due to the
importance placed upon public appearances. 5 Couples did not want
to suffer the embarrassment of admitting to their families that they
had problems within their marriages. 6 Family members also
forced unhappy parties, especially wives, to remain in the union
because of the potential harm to alliances or to the family name
which could result from a divorce.' 7
The continuation of unhappy marital unions was also perpetu-
ated by the subordinate position of women in society.'8 During this
period, society viewed women as being similar to children, lacking
solid sense.'9 The husband maintained legal dominion over his
wife, and she had no independent rights.20 This patriarchal order
placed women in positions where they were often viewed as
12. See id.
13. See id. But see id. at 11 (noting that King Henry VIII was capable of obtaining a
divorce with remarriage due to his political power which dominated the newly established
ecclesiastical courts. Henry asserted that consanguinity mandated his divorce from
Catherine of Aragon. She had previously been married to his brother, Arthur, and Henry
argued that his subsequent marriage to Catherine resulted in incest.).
14. See LAWRENCE STONE, BROKEN LIVEs: SEPARATION AND DIVORCE IN ENGLAND 1660-
1857, at 13 (1993) [hereinafter BROKEN LIVES]; see also MARY ASTELL, SOME REFLECTIONS
UPON MARRIAGE 18 (4th ed. 1970) (stating that friendship should be the basis for a marriage
but also noting that most marriages during the Tudor and Stuart periods lacked it).
15. See BROKEN LIVES, supra note 14, at 13.
16. See id.
17. See Barbara Harris, Marriage Sixteenth Century Style: Elizabeth Stafford and the
Third Duke of Norfolk, 1982 J. SOC. HIsT. 371, 372. This article describes the Norfolk
marriage, a union contracted to increase wealth, power, and connections; the families did not
consider the mutual happiness of the parties to be married. When Elizabeth Stafford became
discontent with her husband's adulterous ways, she challenged the double standard of the
day which allowed men to have affairs and openly protested her husband's behavior. She
wrote to her brother for help, but he sided with Norfolk, advising her to appreciate her status
as the Duchess. He also reminded her that "the main purpose of her marriage was not her
personal happiness, but the social, political, and economic advancement of her kin." Id. at
374.
18. See BROKEN LIVES, supra note 14, at 13.
19. See RANDOLPH TRUMBACH, THE RISE OF THE EGALITARIAN FAMILY 151-52 (1978).
Many men held women to be either "domestic drudges or the slaves of [their] pleasure." Id.
at 151; see also ASTELL, supra note 14, at 30 (ddscribing women as being slaves to men once
they married).
20. See TRUMBACH, supra note 19, at 151.
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property.2 ' In fact, the husband controlled his wife's property, and
in the eyes of the law, they were regarded as one person.22
A final reason for the maintenance of marital unions arose from
the difficulty in obtaining divorces in court. During the Stuart and
Tudor periods, two types of "divorces" existed. Divorces a vinculo
matrimonii, known as annulments, constituted separations with
remarriage possibilities-a modern day divorce.23 In theory, secular
courts did not grant real divorces with unfettered remarriage
possibilities until Parliamentary divorces during the late seven-
teenth century.24 However, church courts granted annulments,
which permitted remarriage. 25 Nonetheless, annulments could be
obtained only through extremely limited grounds. 26 The second
type of divorce was a divorce a mensa et thoro, a separation from
bed and board,2 v whereby couples received permanent legal
separations, but they could not remarry.25
II. MARITAL AVENUES OF ESCAPE
The avenues of escape from unhappy marriages were extremely
limited during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 29 The
ecclesiastical courts maintained jurisdiction over all aspects of
matrimonial law, including divorces, throughout the majority of this
period.3 ° However, only about ten percent of marital disputes
actually went to court for trial, due to the stigma attached to the
divorce proceedings.31 Church courts only heard cases comprised of
extremely unstable marriages.32 The ecclesiastical courts did not
listen to cases in which partners were having simple marital spats;
21. See INGRAM, supra note 6, at 143; see also Henry Smith, A Preparative to Marriage,
in A PREPARATIVE TO MARRIAGE, AND Two OTHER SERMONS 1, 62 (1591) (discussing the view
that the man was the head of the family and what "the husband saith, that his wife must
obey him because he is her better").
22. See RALPH A. HOULBROOKE, THE ENGLISH FAMILY 1450-1700, at 97 (1984).
23. See GIBSON, supra note 10, at 10.
24. See MCGREGOR, supra note 8, at 3; ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 5, at 46.
25. See GIBSON, supra note 10, at 10.
26. See INGRAM, supra note 6, at 145-46.
27. See, e.g., id. at 146-47 (describing a separation from bed and board).
28. See GIBSON, supra note 10, at 12.
29. See INGRAM, supra note 6, at 145.
30. See id. at 3.
31. See BROKEN LIVES, supra note 14, at 11; ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 5, at 167.
Lawrence Stone noted that if a husband wished to avoid the publicity attached to a judicial
separation, he could produce an unofficial separation from his wife. The tiresome wife would
be "imprisoned" in a secluded country home or in a private madhouse. Such remedies did
not exist for wives who were displeased with their husbands' behavior. See id.
32. See INGRAM, supra note 6, at 148.
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fights based upon incompatibility were not viewed as a sufficient
cause for divorce.' Rather, judges believed these problems should
be resolved by the parties, outside of the judicial system.34
As noted, the judiciary sanctioned only two types of separa-
tions: divorces a mensa et thoro and annulments.
A. Annulments
Annulments, which had remarriage possibilities, were granted
in limited situations in which an impediment to the marriage
existed, making it unnatural to continue.35 Parties obtained annul-
ments rarely because of the small number of circumstances to
which they applied. Causes for annulments included bigamy, a
failure to consummate the marriage, duress in the formation of the
marriage, consanguinity, and the existence of a pre-contract, a prior
contract to marry another person.36
B. Separations from Bed and Board
The second method of divorce during the Tudor and Stuart
periods consisted of a divorce a mensa et thoro, a separation from
bed and board.3 ' This divorce was easier to obtain and more
common. Spouses lived in separate households, yet the marriage
was not officially terminated. Therefore, remarriage was not per-
mitted.38 The marriage remained valid until one of the spouses
died.39 The ecclesiastical courts did not permit remarriage in such
divorces in hope of a reconciliation between the parties.4" They also
wanted to decrease evidence tampering at trial.4 '
33. See id. at 180.
34. See, e.g., id. (noting that ecclesiastical courts did not interfere in couple's everyday
squabbles). Examples of incompatibility not worthy of a divorce included clashes of
temperament, spouses having different lifestyles, and complaints made by the wife.
35. See GIBSON, supra note 10, at 10.
36. See id.
37. See INGRAM, supra note 6, at 146. These terms are synonymous and will be used
interchangeably throughout the remainder of this Note.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 185.
41. See id. It was feared one party would tamper with the evidence at trial if remarriage
possibilities were dangled in front of the couple. Evidence tampering at trial was limited as
parties could only divorce with strong evidence and through long trials, during which,
problems with the evidence could be discovered. See id. This idea is similar to the modern
concept of collusion, when parties to a divorce invent a reason or a fault which could facilitate
the divorce process. See id.
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1. Grounds
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, only major
causes of marital disharmony arrived in front of the spiritual
courts.42 Three grounds for divorces a mensa et thoro existed during
this period: life threatening cruelty, adultery, and desertion.43
While incompatibility was a major cause of marital tensions, it was
not a cause for divorce."
Life threatening cruelty was a common cause for separation
suits. 45 The common law permitted the beating of wives, so women
had to prove "abuse sufficient to endanger their well-being or even
their life."46 The case of Boteler v. Boteler demonstrated the level of
abuse women endured before being able to obtain separations.
Cruelty escalated throughout the Boteler marriage and culminated
in extreme acts of abuse.47
[Me repeatedly beat and kicked her, often on the breast, or the
belly when she was pregnant.... He twice threw a chamber-pot
at her, and once a chair. Once he dragged her by her smock
along the ground about the house, and several times he
threatened her with his sword.48
Only when the abuse reached such a high level, as in the
Boteler marriage, could a divorce be granted to a woman during the
sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries.49
Physical assault constituted only one type of life threatening
cruelty. Life threatening cruelty also included sexual cruelty, such
as rape or forcing a woman to have intercourse in the presence of
42. See id. at 181.
43. See BROKEN LIVES, supra note 14, at 16.
44. See INGRAM, supra note 6, at 182.
45. See id. at 183.
46. Id. (citation omitted). But see WILLIAM HEALE, AN APOLOGIE FOR WOMEN 43
(Garland Publishing, Inc. 1978) (1609). William Heale did not support the legality of wife
beating because it decreased the respect women were due. See id. Rather, he believed
women should be corrected with words and they were "never to be dealt withal with violent
handes." Id. Upon marriage, society viewed men and women as one flesh so Heale felt men
should not beat women because it would be comparable to beating themselves. While he
advocated better treatment for women within marriage, he did not assert that women and
men were equals. See id.
47. See BROKEN Lives, supra note 14, at 33-37.
48. Id. at 34.
49. See INGRAM, supra note 6, at 180. It was ordinarily the wife who was abused by her
husband. Wives, however, could abuse their husbands with harsh words or by hitting and
scratching them. However, these cases were rare. Moreover, husbands rarely sued their
wives for a separation based upon cruelty because they feared being ridiculed by a society
which believed husbands should control their wives. See id.
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servants, and such abuse could serve as another grounds for
divorce. 0
Furthermore, mental cruelty also existed in marriages during
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.51 However, women had
difficulties proving mental cruelty, as no definitive evidence could
be presented in court. It was therefore not a convincing cause for
divorce. 2
Adultery was another cause for divorces a mensa et thoro.
However, "[a] dultery underlay only a minority of separation suits"5 3
because wives were told to be patient and to forgive their wayward
husbands.'" Throughout the judicial system, adultery was consid-
ered a much more serious offense for women than for men; 5 society
blamed wives more for their infidelities. Englishmen justified
divorces for unfaithful wives by claiming the Bible established this
precedent.5 ' Husbands cited the Bible for the proposition that
husbands and wives were made of one flesh. 7 When an adulterer
joined with another, the marital bond broke because the husband
and wife separated due to the infidelity."
The ecclesiastical courts permitted divorce for adultery because
of the shame brought upon the husband when his wife's adulterous
actions became public knowledge.5" "This is one reason they usual-
ly give for Divorce; namely, To secure our own Integrity and
Honour, and keep off the suspicion of being privy to the Sin."6
0
Husbands also justified divorces due to a wife's infidelity because
of the fear that an illegitimate child would be born, subsequently
50. See BROKEN LIVES, supra note 14, at 35. In the Boteler case, the court considered
marital rape when granting the divorce. However, marital rape was not a recognized crime.
See WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 3.
51. See ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 5, at 198-99.
52. See id. (noting that women had to wait until the late eighteenth century before
mental cruelty was considered by the courts as a sole cause for divorce).
53. INGRAM, supra note 6, at 182.
54. See LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX, AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500-1800, at
501-02 [hereinafter FAMILY, SEX, AND MARRIAGE].
55. See BROKEN LIVES, supra note 14, at 15-16.
56. See A Treatise Concerning Adultery and Divorce, in ADULTERY AND THE DECLINE OF




59. See id. at 15.
60. Id. See also TRUMBACH, supra note 19, at 155-56 (noting that a husband could sue
his wife's lover for criminal conversion whereby he would obtain damages for the use of his
wife's body by another. A wife had no such suit available to her.); BROKEN LIVES, supra note
14, at 23 (discussing the detention order where a husband could detain his wife in his home
if she was induced to leave by her lover. Such a defense also did not exist on the wife's part.).
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corrupting the family line. 1 No aristocrat wanted his title to be
inherited by an illegitimate son and therefore used the court system
to protect it. Adultery suits against husbands by wives were possi-
ble, but were not usually successful because of the double standard
of the day-the idea that men had the right to commit adultery
with no repercussions, but not women.62
A final cause for a separation from bed and board was mali-
cious desertion. If one spouse abandoned the other spouse for over
seven years, the abandoned party was free to remarry, as the first
spouse was assumed to be dead. 3 However, if the first spouse
returned, courts considered the first marriage valid, not the
second.64 Thus, the divorce was never truly permanent, since the
possibility of reversing the decision always existed. Husbands
whose wives had deserted them could also forcibly bring their wives
home,65 instead of trying to divorce them.
2. Recourse
Strict criteria existed for separations from bed and board,
another attempt to keep marriages together. Parties had to
cohabitate as a married couple for several years before filing for
divorce-evidence to the judges that they had made an effort to
work out their differences.66 Moreover, judges had to find that the
divorce was necessary. 7 The above criterion greatly limited the
number of divorces during the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. 61 "[Bletween 1570 and 1659 we find forty-nine known
cases of notorious marital quarrels, separations a mensa et thoro,
or annulments among the peerage, which is about 10 per cent of all
marriages."69
61. See Treatise Concerning Adultery, supra note 56, at 15-16.
62. See ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 5, at 193.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 194-95.
65. See BROKEN LIVES, supra note 14, at 18; see also INGRAM; supra note 6, at 181
(explaining that either a deserted husband or a deserted wife could sue for restitution of
conjugal rights, in effect, forcing the party who deserted the marriage to recommence living
with the deserted spouse. These suits, however, were not common as the ecclesiastical courts
lacked enforcement power.).
66. See INGRAM, supra note 6, at 185-86.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 35-64 (discussing the limited causes for a divorce).
Because urgency was needed for a divorce, judges granted them only for fault causes, not for
incompatibility between the parties. See id.
68. See LAWRENCE STONE, THE CRISIS OF THE ARISTOCRACY, 1558-1641, at 661 (1965)
[hereinafter CRISIS OF THE ARISTOCRACY].
69. Id.
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During this period, women suffered financially and psychologi-
cally as a result of divorces a mensa et thoro.' ° Isolation remained
one of the greatest difficulties for separated wives 7 1-often cut off
from polite society, shunned from social gatherings, and forced to
live alone due to the embarrassment and stigma brought upon them
by divorce." Furthermore, mothers lost contact with their children
as a consequence of their separations." Husbands could deprive
their wives of any chance to speak to their children after the divorce
occurred.74 Additionally, after a divorce, children tended to side
with their fathers because they controlled the purse-strings and
were still accepted in polite society.75 In standing by their fathers,
children secured their place in society and maintained a solid
reputation.76  However, their actions further isolated their
mothers."
Women also suffered from financial hardships as a result of
divorces a mensa et thoro."8 The ecclesiastical courts supported a
wife's right to maintenance in a separation from bed and board.79
The courts upheld this practice because when a woman married,
her real and personal property came under her husband's control.80
Moreover, after a divorce, the husband maintained control over all
of the family's assets, including his ex-wife's property.8 ' Unless a
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id; see also Harris, supra note 17, at 375. The author describes the Duchess of
Norfolk as living like a prisoner after her separation because "no gentlemen nor
gentlewoman dare not come at me." Id.
73. See ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 5, at 5.
74. See id. (describing fathers as having complete control over the children and being
capable of denying their wives any access to them); see also WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 218
(stating that common law England recognized the father as the guardian of children, not the
mother. Society viewed children as property of the father, so only he had a right to the
custody of the children). But see ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 5, at 171 (noting that women
who committed adultery were deemed to be unfit mothers, and they therefore lost both moral
and legal rights to custody. Stone's statement demonstrates that some historians believe
women had a legal right to child custody, a belief which is not greatly supported by other
academics.).
75. See Harris, supra note 17, at 375-76.
76. See id.
77. See id.; see also ROAD To DIVORCE, supra note 5, at 171.
78. See GIBSON, supra note 10, at 17.
79. See id. Maintenance was viewed as a type of personal allowance paid by the ex-
husband, used to pay a wife's daily needs, not long term expenses. Judges decided the
amount yearly, and the husband paid the support periodically. The court did not set a
payment schedule. See id.
80. See ROAD To DIVORCE, supra note 5, at 13.
81. See Margaret F. Brinig & June Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage and
Divorce, 62 TUL. L. REV. 855, 860 (1988); see also ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 5, at 4 (noting
that husbands had great control over their wives' property).
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woman obtained her own settlement from her family,82 she was
completely dependent on her spouse for money after the di-
vorce-without his support she would have no income. 3 However,
during this period, the majority of women did not have their own
settlements.8 Therefore, when they became involved in separation
cases, the judges knew the women would need to be given some
means to support themselves.8 5
The amount of settlement varied. Judges determined the
maintenance based upon the wife's innocence or guilt in the causes
of the breakdown of the marriage, as well as her husband's worth
in estates and investments.8 6 Maintenance usually amounted to
around one-third of the husband's income,87 but the conduct of both
parties influenced the final amount.88 Judges, however, were
normally sympathetic towards guilty husbands and did not make
them pay huge sums in maintenance.8 9 Besides maintenance, the
ecclesiastical courts could also order husbands to pay their wives'
past and future debts,90 including personal expenses, such as
clothing bills. While these payments helped compensate women for
their loss of property at the divorce, once again, enforcement was
All the income from her real estate was retained by her husband, as well as
all future legacies which might come to her. All her personal property,
including her future earnings from a trade and her business stock and tools,
were liable to seizure by her husband at any moment. She was unable to
enter into a legal contract, to use credit to borrow money, or to buy or sell
property. All her savings belonged to her husband.
Id.
82. See GIBSON, supra note 10, at 16.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 15-16.
86. See generally id. (explaining that maintenance was never granted to wives who had
committed adultery or who continued living in adulterous relationships); see also ROAD TO
DIVORCE, supra note 5, at 169 (noting that women who had affairs during their separations
from bed and board could lose their alimony support).
87. See BROKEN LIVES, supra note 14, at 13.
88. See GIBSON, supra note 10, at 16; see also Brinig & Carbone, supra note 81, at 860-61
(noting that maintenance continued only so long as the wife remained chaste and single
during her separation from her husband).
89. See GIBSON, supra note 10, at 16; see also LENA C. ORLIN, PRIVATE MATTERS AND
PUBLIC CULTURE IN POST-REFORMATION ENGLAND 135-36 (1994). The author depicts the
separation between Lady Elizabeth Lyttleton and Sir Francis Willoughby. Elizabeth received
maintenance, but it was not sufficient to move about in polite society. She begged her
husband to readmit her into his household, emphasizing her rehabilitation in attitude.
Elizabeth had learned that without the security of her husband's finances, women in England
held tenuous positions in society and encountered both social and financial difficulties. See
id.
90. See LAWRENCE STONE, UNCERTAIN UNIONS: MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1660-1753, at 15
(1992).
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difficult to achieve. 91 In the same vein, a wife's court costs could
also be imputed to her husband.92
One problem with the alimony system during the Tudor and
Stuart periods revolved around the ecclesiastical courts' inability to
enforce payments.93 The courts did not deem maintenance to be a
debt owed by the husband to the wife and was therefore not
enforceable in the common law courts. 94 Thus, only the spiritual
courts could enforce the payments, and their sole recourse against
recalcitrant husbands was excommunication. 95 Yet, that process
was seldom employed because the courts often sided with the
husbands. 96 Subsequently, women who became separated remain-
ed at their husbands' mercy for living expenses, as they had no way
to ensure payment.97
III. CHANGES BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE REFORMATION
The divorce a mensa et thoro provided a small window of
opportunity for those who desired a true divorce.9 8 After the
Reformation in England in 1529, Puritan and Protestant reformers
introduced new beliefs about marriage, divorce, and women. 99
Despite these new ideas, the ecclesiastical courts maintained *a
monopoly on marriage laws.. and did not deviate from their beliefs
about divorce. It was not until the -mid-seventeenth century that
the reformers' ideas culminated in concrete results-Parliamentary
divorces, private separations, and a more relaxed view of marriage
as a civil contract, not an indissoluble sacrament.' The reformers
believed that if marriage was not a sacrament, then the marital
relationship could be permanently ended with a divorce.0 2
The Protestant and the Puritan reformers introduced radical
ideas about marriage and the position of women in society. 0 3 Both
groups adhered to the view that marriage was not an indissoluble
91. See GIBSON, supra note 10, at 16.
92. See ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 5, at 187.
93. See BROKEN LIVES, supra note 14, at 13.




98. See CRISIS OF THE ARISTOCRACY, supra note 68, at 661.
99. See, e.g., MCGREGOR, supra note 8, at 5 (noting that some reformers believed
marriages should be dissoluble).
100. See ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 5, at 308.
101. See id. at 301, 319.
102. See MCGREGOR, supra note 8, at 5.
103. See ROAD To DIVORCE, supra note 5, at 301.
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sacrament, but rather, was a civil contract which could be ended
under certain circumstances. °4 The reformers' common belief was
that "[God hath ordained remedies for every disease, so He hath
ordained a remedie for the disease of marriage... divorcement ....
He which made marriage did not make it inseparable, for then
marriage would be a servitude."' °5 Remarriage for the innocent
spouse would be permitted for certain fault causes of divorce, such
as adultery, cruelty, and desertion.
10 6
Puritan reformers, a religious group which was more radical
than the Protestants, demanded divorce on the grounds of "irrecon-
cilable incompatibility and mutual hatred." °7 Puritans did not
require a concrete reason, such as a fault ground, for a divorce, and
they believed marriage fell under civil, not spiritual, authorities. °8
Both Protestant and Puritan reformers worked toward creating
greater equality between men and women.'09 It was believed both
men and women were equally bound to one another in marriage, so
both parties should be capable of suing for a divorce--"an equal
right and power in both parties, so as the woman may require it as
well as the man; and he as well as she."" ° Additionally, the
Protestants asserted that women occupied a higher position in
society than was previously believed."' A woman was no longer "a
mere instrument for carnal desires;"1 she had importance in
marital unions too. This change helped begin a slight amelioration
104. See id. at 301, 303; see, e.g., CHILTON L. POWELL, ENGLISH DOMESTIC RELATIONS 1487-
1653, at 75 (1917) (stating that divorce should be allowed for adultery and desertion).
105. Smith, supra note 21, at 107-08. Henry Smith did posit that marriage was a
partnership, and while it could be ended, a couple should try to work through their
difficulties. This principle is similar to the covenant marriage. See id.; infra Part V.
106. See Martin Bucer, Concerning Divorce, in 3 THE PROSE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 274,
303 (J.A. St. John ed., 1848). Bucer, a Protestant reformer, believed a wronged husband
would be able to remarry directly after the divorce, and that the innocent wife could remarry
after one year, ensuring she was not pregnant. See id. Cf ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 5,
at 347 (noting that certain Protestants only wanted remarriage possibilities for an innocent
husband who had an adulterous wife).
107. ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 5, at 348; see also John Milton, The Doctrine and
Discipline of Divorce, in 3 THE PROSE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 169, 191-92 (J.A. St. John ed.,
1848) (noting that marriage was an institution designed to end loneliness and bring
happiness to its participants. When irreconcilable differences arose in a marriage, happiness
and peace would not be achieved, creating the need for a marital dissolution.).
108. See Milton, supra note 107, at 263-64 (criticizing the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical
courts and pushing for civil or political control of marriages).
109. See William Perkins, Christian Economy: Or, A Short Survey of the Right Manner of
Erecting and Ordering a Family According to the Scriptures, in DAUGHTERS, WIVES, AND
WIDOWS 151, 171 (Joan L. Klein ed. & Thomas Pickering trans., 1992) (1609).
110. Id. at 171.
111. See FAMILY, SEX, AND MARRIAGE, supra note 54, at 330.
112. D.R. ROGERS, MATRIMONIAL HONOUR 171 (1642).
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of women's position in society. The seventeenth century also saw
a rise in the position of women due to the increase in the size of the
dowry paid by the bride's parents to the groom. 13 This progression
augmented the economic stakes in marriages, as the wives'
monetary contributions gave women some leverage in the
marriage." 4 Husbands became slightly more wary of alienating
their wives for fear that their families would retrieve part of the
dowry. 115
, Despite the reformers' more enlightened views toward women,
the aristocratic society continued to regard women as inferior
creatures throughout the remainder of the sixteenth and the
beginning of the seventeenth centuries. The idea of coverture, the
joining of the wife's identity to the husband's at marriage, remained
strong, so that women still occupied subordinate positions in
marriage." 6 While wives received larger marriage portions and had
some personal control over these portions, their husbands still
maintained the absolute authority in the marriage."17 Additionally,
women's supposed financial independence was thwarted by the fact
they had little actual control over their real property." 8 It was
assumed the husband would follow his wife's wishes as to the
disposition of the property, but no law forced him to abide by her
decisions."' Women, therefore, remained legally impotent. 120
While women appeared to have more equality in marriage,
nonetheless, their larger dowries failed to free them entirely from
their husbands' control.
The results of the Protestant and Puritan reformers' ideas
culminated in the middle of the seventeenth century, during the
reign of Oliver Cromwell, the Lord Protector and a Puritan. 121
Informal private separations became popular throughout this
period, due to the continued limited means by which divorces were
obtained in the ecclesiastical court systems.2 2 Under Cromwell,
civil magistrates, or justices of the peace, gained control of divorce
113. See FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE, supra note 54, at 330.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 331.
116. See WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 3.
117. See FAMILY, SEX, AND MARRIAGE, supra note 54, at 332-33.
118. See Susan M. Okin, Patriarchy and Married Women's Property in England, 17
EIGHTEENTH CEN. STUD. 121, 129-31 (Winter 1983-84).
119. See id. at 133.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See BROKEN LIVEs, supra note 14, at 20. Private separation agreements usually
awarded the wife maintenance for life. Subsequently, she indemnified her husband against
any of her future debts. See id.
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cases and negotiated separation agreements between couples.'
2 3
Parties did not have to navigate the established judicial system, nor
did they need to obtain a separation agreement from an ecclesiasti-
cal court. 12
4
By 1670, requests for acts of divorce had begun to arise under
the jurisdiction of Parliament.'25 These private acts permitted
remarriage after a divorce and created an avenue of escape for
aristocratic men who were concerned about the legitimacy of their
heirs.'26 "These very early Acts were generally concerned with the
danger that a wife's adultery posed to a nobleman lacking a son to
inherit title and wealth."'27 Men were therefore the usual petition-
ers. "Of the 325 parliamentary divorces, only four were granted to
women, who.., had to prove adultery aggravated by a further
matrimonial 'offence',"' such as bigamy.'29  Parliamentarian
divorces were not well regarded by society, as it was considered dis-
graceful that a woman drove her husband to petition Parliament for
a divorce because of her infidelities.'
30
Women maintained a slightly better financial position in
society after a Parliamentary divorce than after a separation from
bed and board.' 3 ' Despite the stigma, the House of Commons be-
lieved that no matter how horribly a wife had acted during her
marriage, her husband could not leave her destitute.132 If a woman
brought money to her husband at the time of their marriage, she
would most likely receive a support settlement which reflected the
123. See ROAD To DIVORCE, supra note 5, at 149-50. But see id. at 307 (noting that the
ecclesiastical courts retained jurisdiction in England until 1857. Private separations were
just another option for couples.).
124. See id. at 149-50.
125. See generally GIBSON, supra note 10, at 26-32 (discussing Parliamentary divorces);
see, e.g., ROAD To DIVORCE, supra note 5, at 316 (noting the procedure for a Parliamentary
divorce). To obtain a Parliamentary divorce, petitioners had to first file for a separation from
bed and board in the ecclesiastical courts. Then, the petitioner would file in Parliament. The
Norfolk divorce case was the first case in which a petitioner failed to first obtain a separation
from bed and board from the ecclesiastical courts. Despite the controversy, Parliament
granted Norfolk his divorce, partly due to the influence he wielded in the House of Lords.
See id.
126. See GIBSON, supra note 10, at 29.
127. Id.
128. MARY ABBOTT, FAMILY TIES: ENGLISH FAMILIES 1540-1920, at 36 (1993).
129. See id.; see also ROAD To DIVORCE, supra note 5, at 317-18 (discussing the Anglesea
divorce case in which the wife filed suit in Parliament for a separation from bed and board
due to her husband's cruelty). Women also petitioned Parliament for other causes of action,
such as a refund of their marriage portion after a divorce had occurred. See id.
130. See ABBOrr, supra note 128, at 36.
131. See GIBSON, supra note 10, at 32.
132. See id.
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size of this dowry.' Moreover, the settlement in a Parliamentary
divorce was based upon the husband's property, not his future
potential income. 1" "The husband's financial circumstances might
deteriorate, but the Commons' insistence upon secured mainte-
nance at divorce assured the wife of future payment."3 5
Another financial benefit of the Parliamentary divorce revolved
around the change in the structure of maintenance. Women re-
ceived secured maintenance after a Parliamentary divorce-pay-
ments whereby women were guaranteed a set sum of money, at set
intervals for life.' 36 Ecclesiastical courts, however, upheld periodic
alimony where the husbands were required to pay a fixed amount,
but not by any set time during the year. 137 Therefore, a wife could
go for long periods of time without any support from her husband,
subsequently leaving her financially dependent on him, despite her
freedom from the marriage.
3 8
By the end of the seventeenth century, matrimony remained a
fairly stable institution, and few people broke their marital
bonds.'39 Couples who did encounter marital problems continued
to face very limited means of recourse available to them. Even after
the introduction of progressive ideas by the Protestant and Puritan
reformers, English society still did not completely embrace the idea
of permanent separations with remarriage. 140
IV. HISTORY OF U.S. DIVORCE LAW
Similarities exist between common law England and twentieth
century America due to the fact that English common law is a basis
for American matrimonial and divorce law.141 Modern American
fault divorces originated from the common law concept that
marriage is a sacrament14 and should not be ended, except in
extreme situations.' American no-fault divorce laws were derived
from the belief that incompatibility should be grounds for
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. Id. But see ROAD To DIVORCE, supra note 5, at 160, 345 (noting that after a Parlia-
mentary divorce, as well as after a private separation, the husband did not need to pay the
wife's debts, as he did in an ecclesiastical separation from bed and board).
136. See GIBSON, supra note 10, at 32.
137. See id. at 17.
138. See id.
139. See ROAD To DIVORCE, supra note 5, at 350-51.
140. See id.
141. See WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 7.
142. See id. at 6.
143. See id. at 7.
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divorce' 44-an ideal promulgated by Protestant and Puritan
reformers during the seventeenth century. Louisiana legislators
integrated both fault and no-fault ideals into the covenant marriage
law; consequently, a brief overview of the effects of both fault and
no-fault divorces on women is necessary.
Divorce in the United States originated as a fault based
system, 45 designed to keep spouses together "unless the conduct of
one spouse was so incompatible with the continuation of the
marriage that it released the other spouse from his or her marital
obligations." 4 s Legislators adopted English common law causes for
divorce, including adultery, cruelty, and desertion.'47 However,
legislators did not embrace incompatibility as a divorce cause until
the 1970s, as society wished to keep marriages together and
believed incompatibility as a divorce cause would lead to too many
divorces. 4 '
In the United States, society viewed divorce as a failure of the
marital union, and the divorce laws strengthened this idea by
assigning guilt to the party who broke the union through fault-
based actions.141 If a couple wanted to obtain a divorce, evidence of
one party's misconduct was necessary. 50 "Under the fault regime,
as marital fault sufficient to provide grounds for divorce was
difficult to establish, a wife who did not want a divorce could, in
many cases, prevent her husband from obtaining one by contesting
the action." 5' Thus, the "innocent" spouse maintained leverage
throughout both the divorce and the settlement proceedings due to
the "guilty" spouse's violation of the marriage contract and the
"guilty" spouse's need for the other spouse's consent for the
divorce.'52 Additionally, financial awards were linked to fault,
giving the "innocent", party "a decided economic advantage,"5 3 as
only the innocent party could receive alimony. 154 An innocent wife
could therefore be in a better financial position by trading her
144. See id. at 15.
145. See Laura Bradford, Note, The Counterrevolution: A Critique of Recent Proposals to
Reform No-fault Divorce Laws, 49 STAN. L. REV. 607, 608 (1997).
146. Brinig & Carbone, supra note 81, at 896 (citation omitted).
147. See Bradford, supra note 145, at 608.
148. See WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 6, 14.
149. See KAREN WINNER, DIVORCED FROM JUSTICE 31 (1996).
150. See id.
151. Marsha Garrison, The Economies of Divorce: Changing Rules, Changing Results, in
DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 75, 78 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds.,
1990) (citation omitted).
152. See generally WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 1-14.
153. Id. at 13.
154. See id. at 12.
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ability to hinder the divorce for a better financial settlement from
her spouse.'55
Studies have shown that while women generally suffered from
a decreased economic status after a divorce, they received more
property under fault divorces than under no-fault divorces,5 6 and
they also obtained greater and more enduring monetary awards.'57
However, under the fault based regime, society and judges viewed
women as being incapable of providing for themselves, needing to
remain dependent on their ex-husbands for support, even after the
divorce. 158
As a result of the adversarial and acrimonious nature of
divorce, legislators initiated a no-fault divorce law in California in
1970.159 Fault was no longer a concern. Rather, incompatibility and
irreconcilable differences became the basis, a legally recognized
ground, for divorce.6 0 The adoption of no-fault divorces in Califor-
nia produced a transformation "of marriage from an indissolvable
union consecrated by God to an exchange of promises primarily
involving the two individuals and their children."161
Proponents for no-fault divorces believed the new system would
strengthen the position of women in society as they would be
treated as financial equals to their husbands. 162 No-fault divorces
abolished the previous practice of women receiving permanent
maintenance from their husbands.' This past practice had perpe-
tuated the stereotype that women were not capable of supporting
themselves after a divorce, without adequate maintenance from
155. See id. at 14 (noting that it was generally men who wanted a divorce and who
obtained it by offering to pay their wives more money in either alimony or property
settlements); see also Garrison, supra note 151, at 78. Cf June Carbone, Income Sharing:
Redefining the Family in Terms of Community, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 359,,404 (1994) (explaining
that during the fault divorce period, a much greater number of men than women could afford
divorces because women would be denied any spousal support and would encounter financial
difficulties after the divorce if they were at fault and separated from their husbands).
156. See Garrison, supra note 151, at 79.
157. See id. But see Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interests on Divorce, in
DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 130, 133 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay
eds., 1990) (finding that in 1968 California, under the fault regime, fewer than 20% of
divorced women received any alimony whatsoever) (citation omitted). Women fared poorly
after a fault divorce, as few obtained support from their former husbands. See id.
158. See WINNER, supra note 149, at 31.
159. See WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 15.
160. See id.; WINNER, supra note 149, at 31. Even in common law England, incompatibil-
ity and irreconcilable differences were often causes for marital difficulties. However, they
were never a formally recognized grounds for divorce. See supra text accompanying notes
43-44.
161. Brinig & Carbone, supra note 81, at 884.
162. See WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 31.
163. See WINNER, supra note 149, at 35.
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their husbands.'" After the institution of no-fault divorce, legisla-
tors aimed to make women financially capable of providing for
themselves, once they obtained the skills necessary to function in
the job market.' 5
The results of no-fault divorces have varied, with both benefits
and drawbacks. Since the introduction of no-fault divorce, divorces
are easier to obtain, and parties no longer need to demonstrate fault
to obtain a divorce. 6' This standard of proof is extremely helpful
for spouses who were abused by their husbands and who are scared
to testify about the abuse or who have no direct evidence of such
abuse.117 Besides solving the proof dilemma, no-fault divorces help
women whose emotional needs were not met in their marriages, as
well as those who were not able to divorce previously because they
failed to meet the standard of proof for the fault based divorce. 6 '
Despite the benefits, serious financial drawbacks exist for
women who proceed through no-fault divorces. Under no-fault
laws, consent of only one party is needed for a divorce; if the other
party does not agree, nothing can be done to stop the judicial
process.'69 This unilateral divorce procedure170 makes it easy for a
husband to walk out on his wife with little warning,17 1 leaving her
to fare on her own financially, sometimes with no job skills or
health insurance.
Problems also exist with respect to alimony and property
settlements. Under no-fault laws, women cannot introduce
evidence of their husbands' abuse or adultery to bolster their
monetary settlements, as was possible under the fault regime.'72
164. See WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 32.
165. This treatment of divorcing partners as equals developed gradually, precipitated in
large part by Orr v. Orr which held that both a husband and a wife can be required to pay
alimony, dependent upon the financial needs of both parties. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268
(1979). See also WINNER, supra note 149, at 35; WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 167 (noting that
alimony awards in no-fault divorces became rehabilitative, designed to give parties time to
learn a job skill so they could function without alimony). Wives, housewives, and mothers
were supposed to learn a skill and return to the work force immediately after the divorce, so
they could provide for themselves, without financial help from their ex-husbands. See id.
Subsequently, after the institution of no-fault divorces, "[t]he overall frequency of alimony
awards did drop significantly .... Thus, between 1968 and 1972, the percentage of wives
awarded alimony dropped from 20 to 15 percent." Id.
166. See WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 14.
167. See Michelle Mahoney, Finding Fault with No-Fault, DENY. PoST, March 11, 1997,
at El, available in 1997 WL 6067364.
168. See Carbone, supra note 155, at 403.
169. See WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 16.
170. See id. at 26-28.
171. See id. at 20.
172. See WINNER, supra note 149, at 35.
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This limitation results in a "devastating economic impact on women
and children because it eliminates the leverage that women had
when husbands fled under the fault-based system."'73 Moreover,
because little or no weight is placed upon a husband's misconduct
when deciding the divorce settlement, abuse and other faults may
be perpetuated throughout society as men are not being "punished"
for these wrongs. 74
Most women suffer as a result of no-fault divorces. They either
receive equitable awards, calling for a proportional split of the
marital property with their husbands, or they receive an equal split
with their husbands, if they live in a community property state. 175
These divisions are inherently unfair. They do not include intangi-
ble items, such as advanced education, degrees, and career develop-
ment, as marital property which would be divided at the divorce.'76
"Because women typically forgo these less tangible acquisitions in
order to support husbands and maintain a family life, it is women
who are harmed by the law's failure to specifically recognize these
assets as marital property." 77 Thus, women require a settlement
which reflects a standard of living equal to their husbands' and one
which they had become accustomed to during their marriage. Such
a settlement should include intangible items.'78
However, judges fail to consider that many women worked at
home'79 during their marriages, expecting to share with their
husbands the marital assets and money acquired. No-fault divorces
do not recognize these expectations and do not create an equal
standard of living between both households after the divorce. 8 °
This adverse economic impact on women culminates when their
rehabilitative alimony phases out, as they are expected to find new
173. Martha Heller, Note, Should Breaking-up Be Harder to Do?: The Ramifications a
Return to Fault-Based Divorce Would Have upon Domestic Violence, 4 VA. J. SOC. POLY' &
L. 263, 264 (1996) (citation omitted).
174. See generally WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 28-3 1. Under the no-fault divorce system,
a guilty spouse is not punished, as in the fault system, by being barred from receiving
alimony. Similarly, an innocent spouse is not rewarded for his or her good conduct by
receiving a larger amount of alimony. Without having a reward system for good behavior,
negative behavior may be augmented due to the lack of existing sanctions. See id. at 29.
175. See, e.g., TERRY ARENDELL, MOTHERS AND DIVORCE: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL
DILEMMAS, 26-29 (1986) (discussing the different types of property settlements).
176. See id. at 27.
177. Id.
178. See generally WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 74-75, 103-04, 334. Nonetheless, judges
want both spouses' incomes to be comparable and often disregard intangible items. In
reality, property awards often hurt women because under the no-fault regime, property is
awarded either equally or equitably. See id. at 108.
179. See MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY 21 (1991).
180. See WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 380.
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careers outside of the home.181 Additionally, the rehabilitative
alimony usually does not last long enough, nor is it large enough, to
cover the women's expenses until they are completely trained for a
career outside of the home because such training is often difficult
and burdensome.
182
Studies have found that in numerous cases, women suffered
more from financial difficulties after a no-fault divorce than after
a fault divorce. Lenore Weitzman reported a 73% decline in
women's standard of living after a divorce, while men experienced
a 42% increase in their standard of living.'83 Most studies discov-
ered that "[tihe economic consequences of divorce are especially
adverse for women .... payments are rarely frequent or sizable
enough to make up for an appreciable amount of the labor income
lost through the departure of the husband."18 4
Research done by Weitzman demonstrates that several groups
of women suffer financially the most after a divorce.' 85 Her study
indicates that "the pattern of support and property awards tends to
impoverish the long-married woman [undergoing a no-fault divorce]
while it provides the long-married man with an ongoing comfortable
standard of living."'86 Older women who have been married for a
long time
not only face a severely diminished income [from the loss of
their husbands' income], they also have less potential for
supplementing the money they receive from their ex-husbands
with money from employment or other sources. They thus
remain more dependent on their former husbands, and are more
likely than any other group of women to suffer from the courts'
unequal allocation of the husband's income at divorce.18 7
181. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
182. See Bradford, supra note 145, at 615.
183. Weitzman, supra note 2, at 338. But see Richard R. Peterson, A Re-Evaluation of the
Economic Consequences of Divorce, 61 AM. Soc. REV. 528, 528 (1996) (finding that women's
standard of living fell only 27% after a divorce, while men's standard of living increased 10%);
Saul D. Hoffman & Greg J. Duncan, What Are the Economic Consequences of Divorce, 25
DEMOGRAPHY 641, 641 (1988) (finding that the economic status of women only fell about 30%
in the first year after divorce); Greg J. Duncan & Saul D. Hoffman, A Reconsideration of the
Economic Consequences of Marital Dissolution, 22 DEMOGRAPHY 485,488 (1985) [hereinafter
Economic Consequences] (finding that women's post-divorce incomes are 70% of their pre-
divorce income, while men's post-divorce incomes are 93% of their pre-divorce income).
184. Economic Consequences, supra note 183, at 495. Duncan and Hoffman also recognize
that most men find themselves in better positions after a divorce because they maintained
control of their labor income and no longer need to pay large amounts of child support and
alimony to their ex-wives, as they did under the fault divorce regime. See id.
185. See WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 324-25.
186. Id. at 334.
187. Id.
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Housewives and mothers are also harmed by the use of no-fault
divorces.' 88 Women who care for children need greater financial
resources to pay for their children's care.'89 They also need main-
tenance to supplement their own support if they remain at home to
supervise their children.' 90
Besides financial drawbacks, women also suffer psychological
problems as a result of no-fault divorces. The restricted income
women often encounter after a divorce precludes them from
participating in activities which they once could afford, isolating
them from friends and society.' 9' Some women build friendship
networks around their husband's jobs.'92 When they divorce, they
inevitably lose those friends because they feel uncomfortable
socializing with them.' Finally, women disassociate themselves
from married friends with whom they formally socialized with as
part of a couple because they consider themselves out of place,
being without a "date." 94
V. THE LOUISIANA COVENANT MARRIAGE LAw
Marriage in the 1990s is no longer an "exchange of lifetime
promises," but rather "terminable at will."' 95 This view of marriage
was a major impetus for the passage of the covenant marriage law
in Louisiana.' 9 Certain legislators felt that the institution of
188. See id. at 371-72.
189. See id.
190. See id. at 381, 365. Some reformers believe that equality between the genders cannot
be obtained until men and women are equally situated. Lenore Weitzman wrote:
As long as women are more likely than men to subordinate their careers in
marriage, and as long as the structure of economic opportunity favors men,
and as long as women contribute to their husband's earning capacities, and
as long as women are likely to assume the major responsibilities of child
rearing, and as long as we want to encourage the care and rearing of
children, we cannot treat men and women as "equals" in divorce settlement.
Id. at 365.
191. See id. at 335; see also ARENDELL, supra note 175, at 129-30. In one of Arendell's
studies, over "three-quarters of the women told of losing former friends, usually during or
immediately after a divorce.... By divorcing, they had lost their social as well as their
economic moorings." Id. at 129.
192. See WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 335.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. Carbone, supra note 155, at 380.
196. See Today (NBC television broadcast, Aug. 15, 1997), available in 1997 WL 11222538
(interview with Tony Perkins, proponent of the Louisiana covenant marriage law).
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marriage was corrupted and needed to be changed.197 On July 15,
1997, the Louisiana Legislature passed a covenant marriage law
whereby parties to a marriage have the option to enter into a
covenant marriage, instead of the traditional, no-fault marriage 98
used in Louisiana.199 The new law does not alter current, no-fault
divorce law.2 °0 It is simply an alternative in which parties declare
their marriage to be a covenant which should not be broken, despite
difficulties.01 Only when a complete breach of the marital covenant
occurs, can the non-breacher seek a divorce.20 2 Louisiana was the
first state to pass a covenant marriage law, but seventeen other
states2°3 are considering similar bills.20 4 Most of these states have
197. See Covenant Marriage Implementation: Hearings Before the House of Representa-
tives Civil Law and Procedures Comm'n., 1997 Reg. Sess. (La. 1997) [hereinafter House
Hearings] (statement of Representative Tony Perkins, proponent of the Louisiana covenant
marriage law).
198. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 102 (West 1998). Louisiana is a no-fault state, and
divorce is allowed upon proof of a separation period of six months. See id.
199. Some critics believe the legislation is bringing Louisiana back to the days of fault
divorce where collusion was used to achieve a divorce, compromising the integrity of the
parties. See Bruce Nolan, Bishops Back off Covenant Marriage, THE NEW ORLEANS TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Oct. 30, 1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL 12674773.
200. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2356 (West 1998). Louisiana is a community property
state, and spouses are financially equal with respect to the property acquired during the
marriage, even if one spouse stays at home and cares for the children and the other earns
the salary. At divorce, all marital property is divided equally between the spouses,
regardless of fault. See generally ARENDELL, supra note 175, at 26-29. However, what
constitutes marital property often limits a mother's or housewife's award since intangible
items, such as care for the children, are not included. Moreover, women are most often the
parties who sacrifice their income-earning potential to stay at home. See id.
201. See Covenant Marriage Implementation: Hearings Before the Senate Jud. Comm'n.
A, 1997 Reg. Sess. (La. 1997) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Representative
Tony Perkins, proponent of the Louisiana covenant marriage law).
202. See LA. CIrv. CODE ANN. art. 272 (West 1998).
.203. See Americans for Divorce Reform, Covenant Marriage Links (visited Oct. 13, 1998)
<http://www.divorcereform.org/cov.html>. The seventeen states include Alabama, California,
Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, Nebraska,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia.
Arizona passed its own covenant marriage law on May 18, 1998, and it took effect on August
21, 1998. See 1998 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 25-901 (West); see also Mike McCloy et al., Tougher
Wedding Option, Covenant Marriage Gains, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, May 19, 1998, at A-1, available
in 1998 WL 7772430; Richard Ruelas, Marriage Law Lures Couples, Seminar Explores
Covenant Nuptials, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 23, 1998, at B-1, available in 1998 WL 7792650.
However, the Arizona law is considered a "watered down version" of the Louisiana law.
States Don't See Cure-alls in 'Covenant Marriage' Bills, TUCSON CITIZEN, June 16, 1998, at
4-A, available in 1998 WL 13136890. Under the Arizona law, if both parties wish to end the
marriage, they may do so without finding a fault cause or without living separate and apart
for two years, thereby making the dissolution of the marriage easier to achieve. See 1998
Ariz. Legis. Serv. 25-903, 25-904 (West). Couples may secure a divorce through several
means: proving a fault cause, living separate and apart for over two years, petitioning for
a decree of legal separation upon a showing of one spouse's "habitual intemperance or ill
treatment of the other spouse . . . of such a nature to render their living together
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patterned their legislation after Louisiana, but slight differences
exist.
Louisiana State Representative Tony Perkins proposed the
covenant marriage bill for several reasons. He wished to
strengthen the family by making marriage a life-long relationship,
thereby creating security for both parties and their children." 5
Ideally, parties to a marriage would truly get to know one another
before committing to such a union,20 6 decreasing the chance that a
divorce based upon incompatibility would be needed. Louisiana
legislators also designed the law to decrease the number of divorces
by making it more difficult to obtain one.20 7 The divorce process is
slowed, forcing parties to reflect on their disputes and work out
their difficulties. "We basically created a cooling-off period before
insupportable" and then living separate and apart for one year, or having both spouses agree
to a dissolution of the covenant marriage. Id. at 25-903. While the Arizona law has
provisions which appear to make divorces easier to obtain (divorce for fault causes with no
waiting periods), the habitual intemperance provision only applies to the ill treatment of a
spouse. Subsequently, the poor treatment of children does not qualify for the decree of legal
separation, if the treatment does not constitute abuse. See id. In addition, the agreement
clause which allows the spouses to end the marriage upon their agreement practically
negates the purpose behind a covenant marriage, as the union may be easily dissolved
without a waiting period or counseling. Furthermore, one party could be coerced into
agreeing to the dissolution of the marriage, practically a return to the previously used fault
based system of divorce. See Ira M. Ellman, Senate Bill Revives Horror of Fault Divorce,
ARIz. REPUBLIC, March 6, 1998, at B-5, available in 1998 WL 7755404.
204. As Louisiana passed the landmark covenant marriage law more than a year ago, this
Note will focus primarily on the Louisiana law, with some comparisons made to the Arizona
law. However, an in-depth study of Arizona's law is outside the scope of this Note.
205. See Senate Hearings, supra note 201 (statement of Representative Tony Perkins,
proponent of the Louisiana covenant marriage law). Representative Perkins designed a
longer separation period for families with children hoping that with the extra time the couple
would be able to work out their differences so that the family unit would be preserved for the
child. One of Representative Perkins' reasons for the law includes decreasing the number
of children that come from broken homes. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art 370 (A) (6) (West
1998); infra note 215. Note that the Louisiana Senate created an amendment (which was
included in the law) whereby if the abuse of the children was the cause for the judgment for
separation, then the separation period need only last one year in order to release the child
from the abusive environment. But see Ariz. Legis. Serv. 25-903, 25-904 (West). Under the
Arizona covenant marriage law, couples need not undergo any type of waiting period in the
case of adultery, a felony conviction, physical or sexual abuse, drug or alcohol abuse, or
abandonment. Because no waiting requirement exists, their covenant marriage law appears
quite similar to past fault divorces. While couples would need to wait at least one year for
a divorce based on irreconcilable differences, except for in situations of agreement by both
spouses, any fault divorce would be easily attainable. Such an easily obtained divorce could
increase the chance of collusion and could place women back into the position they held after
fault divorces. See supra text accompanying notes 145-148 (discussing fault based divorces).
206. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 273 (West 1998).
207. See Senate Hearings, supra note 201 (statement of Representative Tony Perkins,
proponent of the Louisiana covenant marriage law).
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this very sacred of contracts can be broken."" 8 A final policy reason
behind the Louisiana covenant marriage law is the protection of the
parties to the marriage. If the parties grow apart, the covenant
marriage prevents one spouse from simply leaving the marriage, a
possibility under the Louisiana no-fault divorce law.2"9
The covenant marriage law sets forth stringent requirements
for those interested in obtaining such a marriage. Pre-marital
counseling with a member of the clergy, a rabbi, a marriage
counselor, etc. is mandatory.210 The counseling is designed to alert
the couple to the heightened commitment of the covenant marriage.
Both parties are required to sign a sworn affidavit stating that they
plan to adhere to the covdnant marriage, understand its responsi-
bilities, and agree to seek counseling when difficulties arise.21'
Besides the affidavit, the parties must also sign a declaration of
intent to contract into a covenant marriage.212 Finally, wlen
difficulties actually arise during the marriage, the couple must seek
counseling and try to work through the problems before they resort
to a divorce.2
1 3
The process to obtain a covenant marriage is a bifurcated
system, similar to the Parliamentarian divorce,214 as a judgment of
separation from bed and board must be obtained before an actual
divorce is granted. After the couple obtains the judgment of
separation, they have either a year or an eighteen month separation
208. Id. (statement of Senator Guidry).
209. See id. (statement of Representative Tony Perkins, proponent of the Louisiana
covenant marriage law); see also Today, supra note 196 (interview with Tony Perkins who
states that a covenant marriage eliminates unilateral divorces where women are kicked out
of marriages without warning). Note that the Arizona law weakens this safeguard. Mutual
agreement between the spouses is enough to end the union under the Arizona law, and no
waiting period exists. See 1998 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 25-903(8) (West). However, under the
Louisiana covenant marriage law, even if both parties to the marriage agree that the union
should be dissolved, they still must go through the waiting period.
210. See LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 273(A)(2)(a) (West 1998).
211. The affidavit must be notarized by the counselor, ensuring that the couple actually
went to a counselor and was notified of all of the provisions of the covenant marriage. See
id. at art. 273(A)(2)(a), 273(A)(2)(b), 273(A)(3)(a); Senate Hearings, supra note 201 (statement
of representative Tony Perkins).
212. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 273 (West 1998).
213. See id.; see also Ann Sjoerdsma, Couple Should Exchange Vows with Each Other, Not
the State, VIRGINIAN PILOT & THE LEDGER-STAR, Feb. 9, 1998, at Bl, available in 1998 WL
5535950. The Virginia covenant marriage law legislation was modeled after the Louisiana
statute and requires many of the same features, including premarital counseling, a
declaration of intent which states the couple will take "all reasonable efforts to preserve"
their marriage, and mandatory counseling before any separation or divorce is granted. Id.
Ohio also modeled its bill after Louisiana's law. See Mary Beth Lane, Covenant Marriage
Bill Testimony Marked by Tears, PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 16, 1997, at 5B, available in 1997 WL
6618838.
214. See generally supra note 125 (discussing the Parliamentarian divorce system).
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period215 before they can file for divorce.216 Before a couple takes
either step, the law mandates counseling.2 s7
A judgment of separation from bed and board is the first step
in achieving a divorce in a covenant marriage.21 s The grounds for
separation are similar to the fault grounds for divorce during Tudor
and Stuart times. Adultery by one spouse, abandonment of the
matrimonial dwelling for over one year with a refusal to return, and
physical or sexual abuse of a spouse or child of one of the spouses
or of the marriage are reasons to end the marriage.2" 9 The Louisi-
ana covenant marriage law expanded the common law grounds for
divorce by permitting the commission of a felony with a sentence of
death or imprisonment to hard labor, the habitual intemperance of
one spouse, cruel treatment or outrages so as to "render their [the
couple's] living together insupportable,"22 ° and the living separate
and apart without reconciliation for two years 221 to count as causes
215. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 307(A)(6) (West 1998). If there is a minor child of the
marriage, the couple must wait one and a half years to obtain the divorce. If there are no
minor children, then the separation period lasts only one year. See id.
216. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 273(A)(1) (West 1998). During the separation period, the
couple should be trying to solve the problems in their marriage.
217. See id. But see LA. CODE CIv. PROc. ANN FORM NO. 361 (West 1998) (noting that
within a covenant marriage, if one spouse deceived the other by saying he was not married
and she later discovers he is, then their covenant marriage is legally void. Subsequently,
none of the procedures need to be followed, as one party was never free to enter into the
marriage due to the impediment.).
218. See id. at art. 307(B).
219. See id. at art. 307 (West 1998); see also 1998 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 25-903(4) (West). The
Arizona law also names physical or sexual abuse of a relative of either spouse who
permanently lives in the marital domicile as a cause for divorce, including a child of either
spouse. See id.
220. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 307(B)(6) (West 1998). Note that in order to obtain a
separation from bed and board for mental cruelty the level of cruelty must reach the same
standard of abuse which was set forth in the established Louisiana no-fault divorce statute.
Under the covenant marriage law, mental cruelty was an addition made by the Louisiana
Senate; the original bill only included physical cruelty. Also note that sixteenth and
seventeenth century English courts really did not use mental cruelty as a grounds for divorce
by itself; it needed to be joined by another fault ground. See supra notes 51-52 and
accompanying text (discussing the rare use of mental cruelty as a cause for a divorce a mensa
et thoro); see also Georgia Preacher Is Seeking Voluntary 'Covenant Marriage,' CHATTANOOGA
FREE PRESS, Jan. 3, 1998, at C4, available in LEXIS, News Library, Chattanooga Free Press
file. Under the proposed Georgia covenant marriage bill, fault grounds only include physical
or sexual abuse, abandonment, and adultery. No extension beyond the common law fault
grounds has occurred.
221. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 307 (West 1998); see also Sjoerdsma, supra note 213, at
Bl (describing the Virginia proposed law in which the bill mandates a separation period of
two years for those couples who have children and a separation period of only eighteen
months for those who do not. The Virginia proposed law, as it now stands, would make it
easier for Virginia couples, as compared to Louisiana couples, to end their covenant
marriages.); Marriage-Plus Really a Private Affair, ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 23, 1998, at 8A,
available in 1998 WL 3678551 [hereinafter Marriage Plus] (describing a Georgia covenant
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for separation as well.222 After the separation from bed and board
is obtained, the marriage is not dissolved, and neither party may
remarry.223 The effect of the separation is solely to end cohabita-
tion. The parties maintain their separated status until they either
reconcile or divorce. A temporary division of the couple's goods and
effects also occurs.224 Temporary relief, in the form of spousal or
child support, may also be granted to one party, but is not manda-
tory.225 Thus, some spouses, especially wives, may encounter
financial hardships during the period of separation, subsequently
coercing them into returning to their spouses because of their
decreased financial resources during this period of "problem
solving. "226
An actual divorce transpires after the spouses have lived
separate and apart without reconciliation, and pursuant to a valid
separation decree, for the separation period.227 Once a divorce is
obtained, couples bounce back to the previously enacted Louisiana
divorce statute, which is based on the principles of no-fault and
community property.22 In addition, while Louisiana is a no-fault
state, judges consider fault in the determination of spousal
support.2 29 Thus, the covenant marriage law only alters the means
marriage bill which would permit a divorce for a fault-based reason or after a separation
period of only one year).
222. See 1998 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 25-903 (West). The Arizona covenant marriage law has
even further extended the grounds for dissolving a covenant marriage. The law also includes
the habitual abuse of drugs or alcohol by one spouse or the agreement of both spouses to
dissolve the covenant marriage to be grounds for divorce. See id. at 25-903(7), 25-903(8).
223. See LA. Cirv. CODE ANN. art. 309 (West 1998).
224. See id. at 309(B). The property is divided according to the community property
guidelines of the state. It will be re-joined when reconciliation between the parties occurs.
225. See id. at art. 308; see also id. at art. 111; Wheelahan v. Wheelahan, 644 So. 2d 1125,
1127 (La. Ct. App. 1994). Note that under the Louisiana civil law, temporary alimony is not
based on fault-any party who needs the financial support can receive it. But see Ellman,
supra note 203, at B5 (stating that temporary alimony is not available in Arizona during the
two year separation period).
226. It appears as if the Louisiana legislators almost hasten a divorce by taking steps
which are performed during divorce proceedings, such as the division of property and the
assignment of alimony. Legislators designed the separation period to have couples work out
their problems, in an effort to continue their marriage, not prepare them prematurely for
divorce and the final division of their property.
227. See LA. CIrV. CODE ANN. art. 307 (West 1998).
228. See id. at art. 102.
229. See id. at art. 112. See, e.g., Simon v. Simon, 696 So. 2d 68 (La. Ct. App. 1997)
(stating that the spouse seeking alimony cannot have legal fault in the break-up of the
marriage, or spousal support would be precluded). See also supra note 157 and
accompanying text (noting that while critics state that women occupy better financial
postiorns after fault divorces, as compared to no-fault divorces, they still suffer economic
hardships). It appears as though women will not improve their financial positions after the
dissolution of a covenant marriage as compared to after the acquisition of a no-fault divorce.
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of creating and dissolving a marriage, not the post-divorce circum-
stances of the parties.
Some legislators and lobbying groups have concerns about the
effect of the covenant marriage law on women. While the law
names physical abuse as a cause for divorce, the covenant divorce
may perpetuate domestic violence and the abuse of women.23 °
Victims of domestic violence, usually women, must prove their
physical abuse in two court proceedings in order to obtain a
divorce:23 the proceeding for separation from bed and board, as
well as the actual divorce proceeding.23 2 Making women prove their
abuse places them in an inferior position in society and could
discourage them from trying to leave abusive relationships.233
This requirement also makes it difficult for women to secure a
separation, as evidentiary problems are bound to exist. If a woman
encountered abuse when no witnesses were present and if she did
not take pictures of the results of that abuse, no direct evidence can
be presented in her favor.234 Additionally, with no evidence, no
separation will be granted on the abuse grounds. Rather, the
woman must continue to live in the marriage until the two year
period tolls for living separate and apart, instead of the one year
requirement for physical abuse.23 Moreover, if a battered spouse
flees her home, due to the abuse, and returns later, she cannot file
for a separation from bed and board, despite the abuse, because she
abandoned her spouse and would be viewed as the guilty party.236
The abuser, however, would be justified in filing for a separation
because of his wife's abandonment-an unfair situation for the
abused spouse.
Besides the proof conundrum, other aspects of the covenant
marriage law adversely affect victims of domestic violence. The law
230. See Today, supra note 196; Senate Hearings, supra note 201 (statement of Martha
Kegel, representative for the ACLU).
231. See Senate Hearings, supra note 201 (statement of Martha Kegel, representative for
the ACLU).
232. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 307(A), 307(B) (West 1998).
233. See Senate Hearings, supra note 201 (statement of Martha Kegel, representative for
the ACLU).
234. See id. (statement of Martha Kegel, representative for the ACLU).
235. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 307 (West 1998); Senate Hearings, supra note 201
(statement of Martha Kegel, representative for the ACLU). Neither waiting period is ideal
for a battered woman, as she could suffer more abuse during that period. But see 1998 Ariz.
Legis. Serv. 25-903 (West). The Arizona law does not require a waiting period for physical,
sexual, or emotional abuse of a spouse which will greatly help abused women who agree to
a covenant marriage.
236. See Senate Hearings, supra note 201 (statement of Martha Kegel, representative for
the ACLU).
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emphasizes the need for couples to spend time together and to work
through their problems.237 While an abused spouse is only required
to remain separated from her husband for a year before obtaining
a divorce,238 that period is still long enough to present further
opportunities for abuse. The mandatory counseling also poses
problems for battered women. It is principally unfair that an
innocent, abused spouse must undergo counseling when she did
nothing wrong.
Domestic violence is the one particular area where you should
never have to put the woman in the same room with her abuser.
... So where there's one person who manipulates the other,
where there's someone who puts the other in fear, that's going
to be the same relationship that's going to go into that counsel-
ing.23s
The law almost appears to punish women who suffer abuse by
making it difficult for them to receive any redress.
Besides concerns with domestic violence, the waiting periods
have other consequences which adversely affect women. The sepa-
ration period prolongs a painful and emotionally draining experi-
ence, while also forcing couples to stay in a marriage in which they
are unhappy.24 ° Additionally, during the separation periods, the
property is divided and women who are housewives and mothers
lose the economic benefits of their husbands' incomes which they
relied upon when married.24' While temporary support24 2 is helpful,
it will not return women to the standard of living they had become
accustomed to when married-a foreshadowing of their lives after
the divorce.243
237. See id. (statement of Representative Tony Perkins, proponent of the Louisiana
covenant marriage law).
238. See Marriage Plus, supra note 221, at 8A.
239. Today, supra note 196 (statement of Lynne Gold-Bikin, an opponent of the covenant
marriage bill). But see id. (statement of Representative Tony Perkins, noting that the
counseling requirement does not mandate that both spouses be present in the same room;
counseling may be done in separate sessions. Counseling for abused spouses is mandated
because a marriage is made of two people, and therefore, both should undergo some form of
counseling when trying to salvage the marriage.).
240. See id. (statement of Lynne Gold-Bikin, an opponent of the covenant marriage bill).
241. See id.
242. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 308(D) (West 1998). Under the covenant marriage law,
the temporary support available includes, "spousal support, claims for contributions to
education, child custody, visitation rights, child support, injunctive relief and possession and
use of a family residence or community movables or immovables." Id.
243. See supra Part IV (describing the effects of fault and no-fault divorces on women in
America).
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The covenant marriage law also reinforces some of the difficul-
ties women encountered when exiting a marriage during the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries. It is generally easier for men,
than women, to exit their marriages.2" In Louisiana, men tend to
earn more money than women.245 In addition, men generally tend
to be more financially secure during a separation and after a
divorce than are women.24 Subsequently, they are more willing to
file for a separation because of this financial security.247 Men are
also socialized to be more competitive, making them better equipp-
ed psychologically to leave a marriage than women who are socializ-
ed to please others.248  Moreover, the continuation of no-fault
divorce decrees based on community property ideals, as well as
fault based grounds for alimony, will continue to subjugate women
financially.249
The effect of the Louisiana covenant marriage law is not
known. "Out of 11,169 marriage licenses sold in Louisiana from
August 15, 1997, when the law took effect, until January 15, only
120 were covenant licenses, or 1 percent"250 of total licenses sold.
However, on Valentine's Day, between three and four thousand
previously married couples chose to opt into the covenant marriage,
increasing its success rate.25' It appears as though potential
spouses doubt the efficacy of the covenant marriage law.
VI. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE LOUISIANA COVENANT MARRIAGE
LAW AND THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW
When comparing the Louisiana covenant marriage law to the
English common law, many similarities exist between both the
structure of the laws, as well as their effects on women. One
wonders if society has come full circle-are women being placed
back into subordinate positions in society under the covenant
244. But see infra text accompanying note 284 (stating that the covenant marriage law
does not directly discriminate against women).
245. See Terry A. O'Neill, This Law Hurts Women, U.S.A. TODAY, Aug. 14, 1997, at 14A.
246. See Economic Consequences, supra note 183, at 495.
247. See id. But see Today, supra note 196 (statement of Tony Perkins indicating that one
benefit of the law revolves around the fact that it is not unilateral so women are not
surprised with the divorce and have time to prepare financially for the divorce through job
training).
248. See O'Neill, supra note 245, at 14A
249. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
250. Some Couples Seek Extra Commitment, DES MOINES REGISTER, Feb. 15, 1998, at 1,
available in 1998 WL 3193819.
251. See Michael J. McManus, Covenant Marriage Legislation a Solid Idea, FRESNO BEE,
Feb. 28, 1998, at C7, available in 1998 WL 8733398.
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marriage law, as they were 300 years ago? Despite the numerous
parallels, a return to the archaic days of common law England,
where women lived in subservient positions to men both during and
after divorce proceedings, is not probable. The differences between
the two periods are too great to fathom such a complete return.
Women possess a stronger position in society than they did during
the Tudor and Stuart periods. In the twentieth century, women
own property, have standing to sue in court, and vote-legal rights
they lacked in the past.252 While women continue to maintain a
subordinate financial position to men during and after divorces, the
divorce laws are no longer written and interpreted in an implicitly
unequal fashion, thus vastly improving the position of women.
Similarities exist between the dissolution of covenant mar-
riages and English common law divorces. Both rely on comparable
fault grounds which are needed in order to obtain a divorce:
adultery, desertion, or abuse.25 3 Additionally, attempts to get the
parties to reconcile are prevalent. In both legislatures, lawmakers
looked down upon incompatibility as a cause for divorce. 254 Strife
was not desired in marriages, and legal authorities believed the
parties should work through their marital difficulties-not
divorce.255
With respect to post-dissolution support, both sets of courts
provide wives with some financial assistance during and after the
divorce proceeding. In actuality, aristocratic women were placed in
better financial positions 256 after a divorce in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, than twentieth century women, simply
because the courts did not expect them to obtain work outside of the
252. See ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 5, at 4; see also supra notes 80-83 and accompany-
ing text.
253. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. Louisiana legislators expanded the
covenant marriage grounds for divorce beyond the traditional fault grounds granted in
common law England, thereby suggesting that the common law courts strove even more to
keep marriages together. Also note that while both periods offer fault causes for divorce,
women during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries encountered more difficulty having
their fault grounds recognized in court. This scenario does not appear to be the case with the
dissolution of covenant marriages. However, as no case law exists to date, I cannot be
certain.
254. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 307(B)(6) (West 1998) (permitting incompatibility as
grounds for divorce, but only after a two year separation period); see also INGRAM, supra note
6, at 180-82. Note that during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, incompatibility was
completely forbidden as a cause for divorce. See id.
255. See Smith, supra note 21 at 107; Senate Hearings, supra note 201 (statement of
Representative Tony Perkins, proponent of the Louisiana covenant marriage law).
256. Exceptions did exist, and in some separations from bed and board, women were given
insufficient maintenance.
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home to subsidize their maintenance.257 Subsequently, women
received a larger percentage of their needed finances from their
spouses.58 While women who enter into covenant marriages might
receive a smaller overall amount of financial support from their
husbands than their counterparts did during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, real sanctions exist if the husband does not
pay alimony today.25 9 Nonetheless, husbands continue to avoid
such sanctions and elude spousal and child support payments.26 °
The limited nature of the post-dissolution support, found in both
laws, creates a decreased standard of living for women of both
periods.26'
Another similarity between the laws during both periods
concerns the well-being of children. Under the English common
law, social ostracism for the wife, and possibly for her children,
existed after a divorce.262 The lack of financial support for children
could encourage women to try to keep their marriages together, as
they did not want their children to suffer.2 63 Comparatively, one of
Tony Perkins' main reasons for the covenant marriage law in
Louisiana included the protection of children-both psychologically
and financially. 2 4 He believed children who grew up in a household
with two parents would fare better, as they had the economic and
emotional support of both parents.265
257. See GIBSON, supra note 10, at 16.
258. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text. The previous assertion would only be
true if the husbands paid the maintenance, as expected. Some women encountered problems
with enforcement, as the ecclesiastical courts could only excommunicate wayward husbands.
See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
259. See WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 289, 298-309 (discussing wage garnishments and
federal legislation designed to enforce alimony payments).
260. See id. at 283 (noting that one in six men was in arrears for spousal support
payments six months after their divorces); ARENDELL, supra note 175, at 76, 154 (describing
a shocking pattern of failure by divorced fathers to pay court-ordered child support).
261. Note that the amount of spousal support to be received after the dissolution of a
covenant marriage is not a change from the past fault and no-fault rules. The covenant
marriage law maintains the status quo with respect to spousal support.
262. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
263. See Carbone, supra note 155, at 400; ROAD TO DIVORCE, supra note 5, at 5. However,
many children lived with their fathers after a divorce, so often no child support was given to
the wife.
264. See Senate Hearings, supra note 201 (statement of Representative Tony Perkins,
proponent of the Louisiana covenant marriage law).
265. If the separation period succeeds and the marriage is maintained, then the covenant
marriage did effect a change for the better with respect to the protection of children.
However, if the couple obtains a divorce, despite the separation period, then the law failed
to achieve its goal of protecting children. Despite the good intentions of the legislators, after
the divorce, the children will live in single parent households and will probably suffer
financial hardships due to the division of income. See, e.g., ARENDELL, supra note 175, at 76,
154 (describing the low sums paid in child support by divorced fathers and the problems
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Finally, women find themselves in subordinate positions in
society as a result of the termination of their marriages under both
the common law and the Louisiana covenant marriage. During
266both periods, after a divorce, women suffer from social isolation
and psychological difficulties.267 They lose their support and friend-
ship networks, which they had relied upon in the past, due to their
new status as divorced women. 268 However, it appears that after
either fault or no-fault divorces, women tend to distance themselves
socially on their own, while during the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, society isolated the women.2 " Regardless, financial
shortages have caused women in both periods to remove themselves
from the social interactions they had previously pursued. °
Despite the aforementioned similarities, differences definitely
exist between the two periods, forming my conclusion that women
have not returned to such a subordinate position in society as was
found during the Tudor and Stuart periods. The covenant marriage
law is more expansive than the common law, as it permits divorces
for incompatibility271 -a failure of the English common law. Addi-
tionally, counseling between the parties is emphasized in a cove-
nant marriage-unhappiness in the marital union is not advocat-
ed.27 Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, how-
ever, the judges cared little about counseling-an unhappy marri-
age was a burden women simply had to bear.273
The most important difference between the covenant marriage
law and the English common law is the treatment of women
throughout all aspects of the divorce process. While the covenant
marriage law contains provisions which may hurt women or which
may diminish their position in society, due to the overall financially
poor position women inhabit, 4 legislators designed the law to grant
women face when trying to get the fathers to pay the support).
266. For this part of the analysis I am using data collected from women who underwent
no-fault and fault divorces. At this time, no covenant divorces have been granted.
267. See WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 335.
268. See id.
269. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text (describing the forced isolation of
divorced women during the Stuart and Tudor times); supra notes 191-94 and accompanying
text (discussing the self-induced isolation of women who just underwent a no-fault divorce).
270. See supra notes 71-72, 194.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 221, 254.
272. See LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 273 (West 1998).
273. See INGRAM, supra note 6, at 188. If counseling was conducted at all during this
period, parish priests would be in charge. The ecclesiastical judges did not believe it was
their concern.
274. See supra notes 244-49 and accompanying text (discussing the access problems
women have with the modern-day court system, not because of facial discrimination, but
because of their tenuous financial positions in society).
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equal rights to both men and women, especially with respect to
women's accessibility to the legal system. Both men and women
contract the covenant marriage, both are held responsible for
maintaining the marriage and both are permitted to seek an end to
the union if a breach of the covenant occurs. In addition, both
parties have equal access to the courts.275 Moreover, some feminists
believe "Louisiana's new law helps women because it restores power
to the innocent spouse, and it is typically the woman who has the
legal power to file for a fault-based divorce." 276 Furthermore, by
requiring longer separation periods, the law places a check on men
who "are too comfortable with abandoning a family., 27 Such femin-
ists believe that women are no longer helpless and currently have
the power to file for divorces on their own.27 "[IIndeed, women are
the ones who file for the majority of divorces."279
This equal access to the courts did not exist during the Tudor
and Stuart reigns.28 ° The threshold for women to obtain divorces
was much greater than it was for men. Great abuse or complete
abandonment were the sole causes for divorce which allowed
women access to the ecclesiastical courts. Men, however, could sue
for adultery,28' as well as abandonment and abuse. Additionally,
women lacked access to Parliament and subsequently had problems
obtaining redress from that institution.282 The patriarchal order of
society failed to afford women equal treatment to men. "[Sihe puts
herself entirely into her Husband's Power, and if the Matrimonial
Yoke be grievous, neither Law nor Custom afford her that Redress
which a Man obtains."283
275. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 273(A)(1) (West 1998); supra notes 244-49 and accom-
panying text. While both men and women have the same opportunities to bring a divorce
suit to court, men are more likely to do so because of their more stable financial position.
Subsequently, even though no direct discrimination occurs, women suffer from indirect
discrimination, limiting the number of divorce suits brought by them.
276. Melissa Lawton, Note, The Constitutionality of Covenant Marriage Laws, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 2471, 2509 (1998).
277. Id. at 2510. Lawton did point out that women who lack independence and who are
controlled by their spouses might encounter difficulties when trying to end their covenant
marriages. This lack of autonomy could endanger their lives if they were in an abusive
relationship. See id. In addition, the waiting period could severely decrease a woman's
monetary stability. See supra notes 224-26 and accompanying text.
278. See id. at 2510-11.
279. Id. at 2510. But see supra notes 244-49 and accompanying text (discussing the access
problems women have to the modern-day court system, not because of facial discrimination,
but because of their tenuous financial positions in society).
280. See supra notes 49, 52, 62.
281. See ASTELL, supra note 14, at 37.
282. See supra text accompanying note 128 (showing the small number of women who
sued in Parliament for s divorce).
283. ASTELL, supra note 14, at 34.
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Differences also exist with respect to the types of recourse
available to women. Under both laws, women suffer financial
hardships. Nonetheless, once again, the Louisiana law is "on-its-
face" neutral. If either spouse caused the divorce by their own fault
actions, such as adultery, then that spouse, regardless of his or her
gender, would be precluded from obtaining spousal support.
Legislators did not create the law so that women would have a
higher standard of conduct to meet, subsequently making it easier
for them to be at fault.284 Rather, both parties to the marriage must
live up to the same standards.
However, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a
woman's maintenance was directly tied to her actions. The court
decreased her maintenance or stopped it entirely if she had caused
the divorce.2" 5 If a woman's husband was at fault, it did not affect
his financial situation at all-the court did not require him to pay
his wife more money. Women suffered overt discrimination based
upon their gender during common law England.28 6 While women
maintain economically subservient positions to men in society in
the twentieth century,28 7 blatant discrimination has basically been
eradicated2"-the results of the laws remain the problem. Women's
economic inequality, with respect to their salaries in the job market
and with respect to their willingness to assume more of the
responsibilities of child care, helps to preserve the unequal results
of divorce laws.289
The divorces' effects on women also vary greatly between the
laws-another indication of women's improved position in society.
284. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 112 (West 1998). The covenant marriage law is
objectively gender neutral. However, the factors considered by the court, when determining
spousal support under the Louisiana fault laws, are subjective. For example, if a husband
was guilty of adultery and the wife was an innocent spouse, the judge would have to award
her alimony, if she was in need. However, he could decide that her need was not too great
or that her husband did not have sufficient income to give her adequate spousal support to
meet her needs. Ifjudges did, in fact, decide alimony in such a fashion, they would be acting
in a manner similar to their predecessors on the ecclesiastical courts. See supra text
accompanying notes 86-89.
285. See supra notes 86-88.
286. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
287. See FINEMAN, supra note 179, at 36.
288. See id. at 38; see also WINNER, supra note 149, at 53-54 (noting that legislators
designed certain changes in divorce laws in order to abolish the discriminatory treatment of
women throughout the divorce process. However, while the changes "sounded good in
theory; in practice the new system [was] terribly flawed ... due to the manner in which these
laws [were] administered. . . . In earlier days the inequities were built into the law
themselves. Now the laws have changed, but not the attitudes of those who are supposed to
apply the laws.").
289. See FINEMAN, supra note 179, at 36-37.
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During the twentieth century, women maintain contact with their
children after a divorce. In fact, most women become the custodial
parent-caring for and raising their children.29 Even if a mother
is not the custodial parent, in most cases, the court still grants her
visitation.2 9' Such contact with children did not exist during Tudor
and Stuart England. Society viewed women as being unfit to be
parents after a divorce and often deprived them of contact with
their children.2 92
Under the covenant marriage law, women may be more
resourceful and more self-sufficient than they were 300 years ago.
After the dissolution of a covenant marriage, women are expected
to enter the work-force and become self-supporting, as the spousal
support, either from a fault or a no-fault decree, is usually neither
permanent nor sufficient to support a women without other
293income. However, during the Tudor and Stuart periods, aristo-
cratic women did not work, even after a divorce.294 Thus, women
remained completely dependent on their spouses for money,
subsequently placing them in an extremely subordinate position in
society. Such a position does not exist in the modern era due to a
woman's ability to supplement her husband's support payments
with her own income.
One final difference between the English common law and the
covenant marriage law revolves around society's attitudes towards
both women and the institution of marriage. While the covenant
marriage law attempts to reduce the divorce rate by establishing
stringent requirements for those parties interested in obtaining a*
divorce,295 it does more readily recognize the need, in certain
circumstances, for the dissolution of a marriage.2 96 However,
throughout the Tudor and Stuart times, society denounced divorces
290. See ARENDELL, supra note 175, at 18. But see WINNER, supra note 149, at 44-50
(noting that many judges are taking custody away from mothers who previously had been
the primary caretaker because, after the divorce, they must work outside the home. Similar
decisions are not made for men.).
291. See WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 260.
292. This idea was not imposed on the fathers as the law viewed them as the children's
guardian. Even if the woman had not caused the divorce, her husband still retained the
authority to keep her from the children. See supra text accompanying note 74.
293. See ARENDELL, supra note 175, at 155.
294. See supra text accompanying note 83.
295. See supra notes 210-17 and accompanying text.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 219-22 (discussing the permissible grounds for a
divorce under the covenant marriage law). While divorces are possible in any situation,
provided the couple fulfills the two year waiting period, the mandatory counseling and
waiting period do slow down the divorce process. See supra text accompanying note 217.
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for almost any reason.29 7 Furthermore, while the courts permitted
divorces in certain limited situations, families, society, and the
limited access to the judicial system continued to impede divorces
in many cases,29 s severely undercutting the logic behind such
exceptions.
VII. CONCLUSION
Under the covenant marriage law, society has not come full
circle. Women do not inhabit subordinate positions in the commu-
nity during the divorce process, as they did throughout the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Parallels between covenant
marriages and English common law marriages do exist. Both
provide a limited means of recourse when ending unwanted
marriages, and both have provisions which treat women unequally
and unfairly-subordinate to men. However, women who contract
the covenant marriages still maintain more autonomy, freedom,
and equality than did women during the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries.
The Louisiana covenant marriage law is a strong attempt to
decrease the number of divorces, through an alteration of the
methods of entering and exiting a marriage. The waiting period
and the mandatory counseling force couples to examine their
marriages and to attempt to work out their differences, a procedure
that is missing under the current Louisiana no-fault law. When
incompatibility or irreconcilable differences are the causes for
separation, the covenant marriage is a promising law. It not only
provides the couple with time to work through their problems, but
also gives the party who did not want the divorce time to prepare
for it, both financially and psychologically. Such preparation could
combat the feminization of poverty which appears to accompany so
many divorces.299 However, the separation period mimics the
297. See supra text accompanying notes 14-17 (discussing the external pressures families
placed on couples to keep their marriages intact).
298. See, e.g., CRISIS OF THE ARIsTOCRACY, supra note 68, at 660-61 (mentioning the
religious, social, and economic pressures which kept couples together).
299. See Bradford, supra, note 145, at 615 (noting that traditionally under the no-fault
divorce system, women typically had no marketable skills, as they usually stayed home
throughout their marriages. Thus, when they divorced their husbands, they had no job-
related skills by which to earn a living and they were expected to be financially responsible
for themselves). One could infer that with a waiting period, women would have the
opportunity to refine marketable job skills while also receiving temporary alimony. Thus,
upon the dissolution of the marriage, women would have job skills and would be capable of
supporting themselves. But see WEITzMAN, supra note 2, at 351 (stating it is unlikely that
the extended separation period of the covenant marriage law would decrease the
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rehabilitative period after a traditional divorce during which
women obtain job training and receive support from their husbands.
If courts grant support during the separation period, judges might
not extend the rehabilitative alimony if a divorce occurred, further
hurting a woman's financial situation.
While the covenant marriage might ameliorate the position of
women in cases that pertain to incompatibility, in situations where
a fault cause, such as abuse, is the basis for divorce, the waiting
period and the counseling are detrimental to women. Making an
innocent spouse prove her husband committed a fault against her,
in two separate court proceedings, is often degrading and difficult.
Additionally, it is unfair for an innocent spouse to undergo counsel-
ing, as she did not cause the breakdown of the marriage. The
waiting period simply prolongs this painful process and keeps
women in households which are either unhappy or abusive.
Women occupy a stronger position in society under the
covenant marriage law than under English common law. However,
the Louisiana covenant marriage law made few improvements with
respect to a woman's position in society since the institution of no-
fault divorces. The covenant marriage law fails to alter the
implications of divorce. It only changes the methods of entering and
exiting a marriage. In order to improve the position of women in
the post-divorce period, Louisiana legislators must take greater
steps to redesign the marital laws so women achieve economic
equality with their ex-husbands after a divorce. When legislators
only change the entrance into and the exit from marriages, they do
not eradicate the past problems that women have encountered
under the fault and no-fault divorce regimes. The covenant marri-
age law achieves no real difference, as couples bounce back to the
established marital laws in Louisiana. Subsequently, after women
have obtained the dissolution of their covenant marriages, they
becomesituated in economically inferior positions-the same econo-
mically inferior positions that their counterparts who underwent
regular fault and no-fault divorces also occupied. Women do not
gain an improvement in their financial, psychological, or social
standings after a dissolution of a covenant marriage, as compared
to a fault or no-fault divorces.
The Louisiana covenant marriage law has provisions that could
adversely affect women. Until legislators initiate laws that alter
the post-divorce circumstances of women, as well as the entrance
feminization of poverty because women would still lack their husband's income, support
which they had relied upon in the past).
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into and the exit from marriage, women will continue to occupy a
weakened financial and social position in society. Despite the Law's
shortcomings, the covenant marriage law is hardly a return to the
patriarchal society that women endured during the Tudor and
Stuart periods.
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